College sports at a crossroads: With Congress stalled, collective bargaining gains momentum

The long-running effort to secure federal antitrust protection for college sports hit another roadblock this week. The House of Representatives again declined to vote on the SCORE Act, legislation that would have insulated the NCAA and member schools from antitrust challenges tied to compensation limits and transfer restrictions. Without that protection, athletic directors remain stuck navigating a system where, as several coaches have openly admitted, programs are essentially competing to assemble the largest player payrolls—despite the façade of a uniform $20.5 million compensation cap.

In this legal limbo, a once-unthinkable concept is gaining traction: collective bargaining with college athletes.

Athletes.org releases first CBA framework for college sports

Adding momentum to this shift, Athletes.org—a rapidly growing player-advocacy group representing more than 5,000 current and former athletes—released what it calls the first comprehensive collective bargaining agreement framework for college athletics. Developed over two years with input from athletes, ADs, commissioners, and coaches, the document attempts to create a workable blueprint for issues many administrators have long viewed as insurmountable.

The timing is no accident. The House v. NCAA settlement reshaped the economics of college sports but did not supply the legal shield that comes with a negotiated CBA. Without the non-statutory labor exemption that protects professional leagues, schools remain exposed to claims involving health and safety, NIL restrictions, and compensation caps.

The employment status debate: The industry’s most fragile pillar

Looming over every discussion of collective bargaining is the question of whether college athletes must be treated as employees to negotiate a binding CBA. The NCAA and many university leaders have fought that designation, citing cost concerns, workers’ compensation exposure, and a threat to the “student-athlete” identity.

But some athletic directors are no longer convinced that “employee” is a dirty word. Tennessee AD Danny White, who has developed his own bargaining proposal, notes that campuses already employ thousands of students—including some in athletic departments. “How that became a dirty word, I don’t get it,” he recently told ESPN.

White’s model contemplates creating a private entity to employ players, which could bypass restrictions in states where public employees cannot unionize. Athletes.org, meanwhile, proposes a non-employee bargaining structure, similar to the way SAG-AFTRA represents actors classified as independent contractors. This approach would not confer all protections of federal labor law but could still create enforceable contractual rights.

Whether either structure is legally durable remains uncertain—but the real story is that stakeholders are actively exploring solutions rather than waiting for congressional intervention that may never arrive.

Who bargains with whom? The unit problem

Even if industry leaders embrace collective bargaining, difficult structural questions remain.

Athletes.org proposes the creation of a centralized entity—potentially the College Sports Commission created by the House settlement—to represent schools. But the bigger challenge lies in defining bargaining units:

• Should football negotiate separately from men’s basketball?
• What about Olympic sports?
• Should bargaining occur by conference, given revenue disparities between the Big Ten, SEC, and smaller leagues?

Professional leagues avoid these issues through league-wide labor structures, but college sports are inherently decentralized.

Promising — and problematic — features of the Athletes.org framework

The Athletes.org blueprint includes several athlete-forward provisions that would materially improve welfare:

Strengths:

• Five-year post-career medical coverage for injuries sustained during college play—far more generous than current norms.
• Injured reserve protections requiring schools to continue medical care and at least 50% of guaranteed compensation.
• Group licensing authority, which could dramatically increase athlete earnings. (By comparison, the EA Sports College Football 25 agreement yielded less than 1% royalties to players; a professional-style 10% royalty would have exceeded $110 million.)
• Neutral grievance and arbitration procedures, giving athletes an enforceable remedy when agreements are violated.

Weaknesses and open questions:

• No guaranteed contracts by default, leaving critical protections optional.
• A 22% revenue share, far below the 48–51% enjoyed by professional athletes.
• Injured reserve compensation at only 50%, which places substantial risk on athletes.
• Reclassification of scholarships as “compensation,” which may leave Olympic sport athletes with little additional financial benefit.
• Major provisions left “TBD,” including transfer rules, drug testing, enforcement mechanisms, minimum compensation, and practice limits.
• Academic eligibility controlled by schools, with limited safeguards against roster manipulation.

In many ways, the framework reveals possibilities rather than final answers.

Authority problem: Can ADs even authorize collective bargaining?

Even if athletic directors increasingly favor bargaining, most lack the authority to implement it. Decisions on employee classification and labor relations rest with:

• University presidents
• Boards of trustees
• State legislatures (particularly in right-to-work jurisdictions)

Private universities have more flexibility, but face institutional and donor-driven constraints. And despite AD enthusiasm, the broader industry has spent millions lobbying for congressional antitrust protection—not for a labor-relations overhaul.

For collective bargaining to become reality, conferences would need to coordinate their member schools to authorize participation in a unified bargaining entity. That level of cooperation has eluded college sports on almost every major issue.

Conclusion: A turning point without a clear path forward

College sports is approaching yet another inflection point: Congressional inaction, mounting litigation risk, and escalating compensation pressures have pushed administrators toward collective bargaining models once deemed unworkable. Athletes.org’s CBA framework is imperfect and incomplete, but it marks the clearest attempt yet to envision what a regulated, negotiated college athletics economy might look like.

Whether universities, conferences, and lawmakers are willing—or able—to embrace that future is the question that will define the next era of college sports governance. As always, McDonald Hopkins continues to monitor these developments closely.